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
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Prussia's Territory—Where Did She Get It?

An Essay By
FREDERICK W. STEVENS

(December, 1917.)

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Prussia's Territory—Where Did She Get It?

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Compliments of Frederick W. Stevens

The total area of Prussia in July, 1914, (including Alsace and Lorraine, 5,600 square miles, which for reasons to appear, I treat as Prussian territory) was 139,650 square miles, about 5,000 more than the combined area of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. It constituted in 1914, as it had since 1871, about two-thirds of the German Empire.

33,355 square miles of that total area had been acquired within a period of fifty years next prior to the year 1914, as a direct result of three short wars, deliberately sought by Prussia, against weak neighbors, the area containing about six millions of inhabitants and vast wealth,—silver, copper, iron, coal, potash, etc.,—contributing mightily to her present war strength.

Moreover, every Prussian ruler during at least 270 years next preceding the year 1914, added to the Prussian territory in Europe, generally by conquest or what was equivalent thereto,—except two rulers: (1) Kaiser-King Frederick III, who died in 1888, three months after he ascended the throne, and (2) his son, KING WILLIAM II, THE PRESENT KAISER-KING.

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Obviously it is a far reach from the war philosophy of Treitschke to that of Nicolai.

It is said that the first edition of Dr. Nicolai's book, which is in the German language, is already sold out and that a second is being printed.

SHORT WARS DO PAY. This undoubtedly was the conviction of a great part of the Prussian people at the time of the commencement of the present war, which they expected would be a short war; and, as we shall see, there was reason for that feeling.

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Having in mind these facts, is it going too far to conclude that the present Kaiser-King, familiar of course with the glorious achievements during nearly three centuries of all his divinely appointed ancestors, has had it in mind these many years that it was up to him to keep up the record? His father, who reigned only three months, was of course excusable on the divine record. But as for himself, reigning 26 years, what could be offered in mitigation of his neglect to make substantial progress toward the consummation, divinely provided for, that all the peoples of the world are to be ruled by the Hohenzollern dynasty, God's elect?

The story of the creation of the present German Empire in 1871, the King of Prussia to be ipso facto German Emperor, and the story of the growth of Prussia, are well known to many. This brief account is for others.

Let us first take a survey of recent Prussian history.

From the time of the final overthrow of Napoleon in 1815, down to 1871, the term "Germany" was a mere geographical expression, including within it the territory and people of Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Wurtemberg, Baden, Hanover until 1866, and twenty or more duchies, grand duchies and principalities. There was no German Empire, no common ruler, by any name, over those numerous units; but from 1815 until 1866 autocratic Austria was the proud and dominant unit, exercising a powerful influence over them all, with Prussia as a jealous and ambitious rival for such leadership. The jealousy and rivalry between Austria and Prussia began in the seventeenth century and continued for two hundred years. In the period of Austria's efforts, 1815 to 1866, to maintain its position of leadership among the German people against ambitious Prussia, the rulers of Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Baden in the south, and of the Kingdom of Hanover in the north, sided with and in a sense were under the protection and patronage of Austria. It would be difficult to exaggerate the bitterness of feeling against Prussia by the people of those German states down to 1866, at least.

From 1815 until about 1848, occurred a prolonged, intermittent struggle by the people of all or most of the kingdoms, duchies, grand duchies and principalities, for the grant of some measure of constitutional government by their respective autocratic kings, dukes, grand dukes and princes, who in proclamations in 1813, to arouse the German people to fight Napoleon, had promised them in plain words that the Prussian type of absolutism would yield to a constitutional form of government. After the downfall of Napoleon, that promise had been repeated, in vague words to be sure; but most of the autocrats had shamefully violated their pledges. That struggle culminated in the revolutionary outbreaks of 1848, when so many Germans,—including such men as Carl Schurz,—fled to the United States, and in the grant from time to time after 1815, by many of such rulers, (including Frederick William IV, the King of Prussia, in 1850) of mock constitutions, of

limited suffrage, and of representative assemblies with decidedly limited powers as against the King,—a story by itself, which in Treitschke's History of Germany is told with great elaboration.

In 1862, Bismarck,—of the “blood and iron” policy,—as chancellor under William I, who had been crowned King the year before, became prominent if not dominant in Prussian history. Sore pressed by his people, was William at that time. The Prussian parliament, which, under the pressure of the revolution, had been grudgingly allowed, was disposed to have a real voice in determining the question how large a standing army should be supported by the people, and how large the army budget should be. It was making itself obnoxious to the autocratic ruler, William I, who desired to continue to handle all such subjects, unhampered by the people, as his predecessors had done for hundreds of years. But that also is a story by itself. Suffice it to say here that Bismarck hated the very name of democracy; that all liberalism was rigorously suppressed; that the parliament was made to realize that it was a mere debating society; that without any sanction of the parliament, the people were made to pay taxes for the support of an increased standing army; that autocratic rule, slightly relaxed for a few years following the revolution, was resumed, under the leadership of Bismarck, who had aims and ambitions, and who proceeded to carry them out in autocratic style. The German people were soon brought to a submissive state of mind; and they have ever since been governed with no further constitutional rights than the very limited ones granted in 1850.

Within nine years after Bismarck became Chancellor, proud and autocratic Austria had been humbled and subordinated; Prussia had established by force her position as the dominant unit of all the numerous German states; Prussian territory had been vastly extended, and consolidated, and its wealth and population vastly increased, at the expense of its weaker neighbors; France, another proud and mighty nation, then under Napoleon III, had been humbled and robbed and fined, by force of Prussian arms; and the King of Prussia who, in 1861, under the pressure of the parliament and the people, had been on the point of abdication, not only continued as King of Prussia, but became German Emperor, ruler over the armies not of Prussia alone, but also of Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, and twenty or more German duchies, grand duchies and principalities, in unlimited control of their foreign relations and practically in control of their destinies.

How was all this done so quickly? By three short wars, two of them so short,—a Prussian might say,—as to be Prussian jokes, and the longest one lasting only six months! To be sure,—he might add,—they were expensive; but there were the indemnities collected from neighbors, amounting to five thousand million francs in one instance, and ten million thalers in another; and there were the 33,000 and more square

miles of territory acquired, and millions of new subjects, and a supply for many generations of coal and iron and silver and copper and potash. Of course, there were many Prussian soldiers killed and some misery caused,—very much to be deplored,—but think of the advantage and glory to those who remain, and to their descendants! Now we know,—thought the Prussians, after these short wars,—that our teachers and professors and our preachers and editors have been right in telling us that God is with us, that we are the chosen people of the earth, that God wants us to run things down here, for all His children, whether they like our ways or not, whatever language they speak, whatever form of government they desire; ours is better for them; and we must prepare ourselves for carrying out God's mighty plan.

There is much to indicate that the controlling minds of Prussia entertained these views for many years prior to the beginning of the present war, which is equivalent to saying that they were entertained by practically all the Prussian people. "Out of their own mouths" it appears. (Appleton, 1917.) After the defeat of France in 1871, Prussian arrogance grew to an extent almost insufferable even by her South German neighbors and allies. The utter contempt of the Prussians for all other nations, has been shown beyond a doubt,—out of their own mouths,—another story.

The War with Denmark in 1864. The two duchies of Schleswig-Holstein, containing 7,280 square miles, had been united to Denmark for centuries, through the fact that a former Duke of Schleswig and Holstein had become King of Denmark; but the duchies were not an integral part of the Danish Kingdom. The Danes residing in Denmark and in the duchies wished to have the union of the duchies with Denmark a real one. The Germans who resided in the duchies did not. Nor did Bismarck; yet there is no pretense by German or other historians that Prussia had any legal right to control either of those duchies, except the right of force backed by a large German population in the duchies. Late in the year 1863, the Danish parliament took steps to incorporate Schleswig within Denmark. Austria, being dominant among the German peoples at that time, was endeavoring to control the matter of the duchies. Bismarck saw a chance to produce a situation which would result in the quarrel he desired between Prussia and Austria and in the acquisition of these valuable duchies for his King. He induced Austria to join with Prussia in war against Denmark. Of course, little Denmark had not a chance. She fought hard, but in a few weeks it was all over; and the two duchies came into the joint control of Prussia and Austria. The inhabitants wanted to be allowed to form a separate state, to become a part of the then loosely constructed German Confederation. But Bismarck wanted no more German states. He was not blind to the fact that the territory involved included a lengthy coast on both the Baltic and the North seas, with several good harbors, notably Kiel, that it was valuable for commercial purposes, and that it

possessed strategical points of great value in working out the destinies of Prussia. He doubtless foresaw the future naval base at Kiel and the future Kiel Canal running across the territory and connecting the Baltic with the North Sea. He wanted the territory for Prussia.

Of course, Prussia and Austria differed as to the disposition of their joint spoils of the short war. Bismarck could be depended upon to see to that. Only the result of the growing friction between Prussia and Austria can be told here,—war between them. The working out of Bismarck's aims involved that, on some ground or other. Austria must be subordinated to Prussia, among the states of the German Confederation. There is not a historian who does not say in substance that as a part of his grand plans Bismarck deliberately brought on this war, on a pretext which is hardly dignified by mention in the histories. Nor does Bismarck himself in his personal reminiscences, published after his death, attempt to conceal the fact. On the contrary he admits that he advised this war; and in his reminiscences he tells how he developed in King William I a "taste for conquest." But, as may be supposed, he did all he could to remove the appearance of the sordid motive, Prussian aggrandizement, and to give the appearance of a fight by Prussia for the reform of the German Confederation.

"The Seven Weeks War." It took only seven weeks in 1866 for Prussia to humble Austria. Indeed, the fighting was all over in about three weeks! Prussia was prepared. Austria was not. The battle of Königgratz on July 3, 1866, settled it. Needless to say, Schleswig-Holstein immediately became a province of the Kingdom of Prussia. We may therefore check off 7,280 square miles as taken by force of arms from a weaker neighbor.

There was something said in the treaty about giving the people of Schleswig a chance to express their wishes as to who should rule over them; but Bismarck saw to it that that right was never in fact exercised. It is the only instance in Prussian history where a plebiscite was in any degree sanctioned by Prussia; and that instance does not count, for the reason stated.

But there is more to the story of the war of 1866. Some of the other German states, who cordially hated Prussia, made the mistake of siding with Austria in that war and preparing to aid her. The Kingdom of Hanover,—with 14,840 square miles of valuable territory, and several large cities, and nearly two million inhabitants, and some sea coast, and vast forests and agricultural districts, and enormous deposits of coal, lignite, iron, copper, lead, silver, zinc, salt and other natural resources, principally in Hanover's portion of the Hartz Mountains,—Hanover, I say, made the mistake of allying herself with Austria. Does anyone need to be told what happened to Hanover? It was ruthlessly wiped out of existence at the close of this short war and became the Province of

Hanover of the Kingdom of Prussia. Check of 14,840 more square miles of Prussia's territory, as taken by force of arms from a weaker neighbor.

The independent "electorate" of Hesse-Cassel, (3,699 square miles), the duchy of Nassau, (1,830 square miles) and the "free city" of Frankfort-on-the-Main, also allied themselves with Austria. None of them had previously been in any sense subject to Prussia. They too were wiped out of existence as a result of this short war, and annexed to Prussia. The ruler of Hesse-Cassel was carried a prisoner to Stettin and was released only on resigning his claims to the throne. The neighboring independent "electorate" of Hesse-Darmstadt also took preliminary steps, like the others, to aid Austria. Result: a heavy indemnity paid to Prussia and a cession of territory, including the then lately acquired landgraviate of Hesse-Homburg (106 square miles) on both sides of the Rhine.

Check off on these accounts 5,635 more square miles of Prussian territory, taken by force of arms from weaker neighbors,—these forming a large part of the Prussian Province of Hesse-Nassau, with its rivers, its mountains, fertile valleys, its thousands of vineyards, its great forests, its numerous mineral springs—including Wiesbaden and Ems,—but above all with great deposits of iron, lead, copper, building stone, coal, slate and other natural resources,—to say nothing of the 1,300,000 of inhabitants in 1866. (The duchy of Nassau was the ancestral home of "William the Silent," famous in the war between Spain and the Netherlands and the founder of the dynasty represented by the present Queen of the Netherlands.)

The Kingdom of Saxony, which also took steps to aid Austria, was let off with a fine of ten million thalers. The Kingdoms of Bavaria and Wurtemberg and the Grand Duchy of Baden, which also sided with Austria, paid no fine and lost no territory. Bismarck had not worked out his plans. He had uses for these southern neighbors, in dealing a blow at France and in forming a German Empire.

Thus, as a result of the short war in 1866, Prussia's territory was consolidated and made to extend from Russia to Holland. With the exception of two brief gaps (Mecklenburg and Oldenburg), she gained control of the entire Baltic coast of Germany and had besides a stretch of North Sea coast. And she had four and a half million more subjects, from which to add to her army, and additional natural resources from which to make guns for them.

(Kind reader, do not grieve over these seeming robberies and those yet to be mentioned. Do not carry too far the sentiments that should control neighboring states. Do not attach too much importance to the fact, for example, that by solemn treaties to which Prussia was a party, the independence of these several states had been more than once recognized. The plans of God must be carried out; they involve harsh steps;

the Hohenzollerns are divinely appointed to take them; and you ought to know that treaties are mere scraps of paper.)

But Bismarck had only gotten a fair start. There were about thirty German states, large and small, to consolidate into an empire; not into the kind of German Empire of medieval days, lacking both material and moral unity and strength, but into an empire with real power, and with the King of Prussia as its Emperor. In less than four years after the close of the War of 1866, Bismarck had played his diplomatic cards so well,—another story,—that several of the important and up to that time independent German units, thought it prudent to follow the lead of Prussia in war.

And there was FRANCE, an old enemy of Prussia, with the score not by any means settled, according to Prussian philosophy,—France, ruled by Napoleon III, a threatening factor in all Prussia's aims. A war with France,—brought on under the right circumstances, mind you,—would unite all the German states under Prussia's leadership; and in the event of success, there would be furnished the finest kind of opportunity to proclaim a Hohenzollern,—William I,—as German Emperor. Success? Was not France known to be weak and her Emperor still weaker, yet ready for any move to revive his waning popularity with the French people?

The declaration of war by France upon Prussia in July, 1870, arose out of circumstances, which can only be briefly alluded to here. There was a vacancy in the Spanish throne, due to a revolution, and among the candidates put forward, with some show of success, and at the instigation of Bismarck, was a Prince of the Hohenzollern family. This naturally aroused the French government and resulted in a notice to the Prussian government that the candidacy was obnoxious to the French, and, if pressed, would be regarded as an unfriendly act, with the intimation that it would be treated as a cause for war. It was Bismarck's purpose to make it a cause for war, and to throw upon France the odium of declaring war. But the King of Prussia was reluctant to allow a war with France. Against the wishes of Bismarck and to his great dismay, the King took steps which resulted in the French government being notified by the Spanish government that the candidacy was withdrawn. This was followed by great exultation on the part of the French people; and in his reminiscences, Bismarck tells how depressed he was as a result, and that he decided to resign. But circumstances almost immediately changed. The French government foolishly made a demand for assurance that the candidacy would never again be renewed. This demand was made upon the King of Prussia, in person, by an ambassador of Napoleon III, at Ems, where the Prussian King was taking the baths. The demand was promptly refused by the Prussian King, who caused the famous telegram from Ems to be sent to Bismarck at Berlin,

(July 13, 1870) recounting briefly the circumstances of the demand and its refusal, and authorizing Bismarck in his discretion to make the facts known to the Prussian embassies and to the press throughout Europe. Bismarck now saw the opportunity to excite the French government to a declaration of war. His form of announcement of the episode to the capitals of Europe appeared in the newspapers at all capitals on the following day, July 14, 1870. It was so worded by Bismarck as to arouse the people of the many German states to the belief that the Prussian King had been insulted by the French ambassador, thereby reviving old-time hostility to France and promoting an alliance with Prussia in the desired war with France, but particularly so as to arouse the excitable French people, on the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille, to believe that the French ambassador had been insulted by the King of Prussia. The French government was thereby lead to declare war upon Prussia, and this was done the next day, July 15, 1870. Bismarck had accomplished his purpose.

Now, if any reader doubts the fairness of these statements, let him read Prussian writers on the subject, especially Bismarck's posthumous reminiscences, in which there is little or no concealment of his deliberate purpose as here stated; indeed, in which that purpose distinctly appears.

The South German states, the same that had allied themselves with Austria against Prussia in 1866, became allies of Prussia.

Within six months after the declaration of war, Napoleon III and vast armies of the French were prisoners; Paris was besieged; the people of Paris were brought to the point of starvation; the Prussians were in possession of the palace at Versailles; Bismarck had carried to a point of conclusion the difficult negotiations with the kingdoms, duchies, grand duchies and principalities which with Prussia were to constitute the new German Empire; and in the Hall of Mirrors in the palace at Versailles, in the presence of a large number of German nobles and generals, Bismarck had the satisfaction of hearing the German Empire proclaimed, and the Prussian King proclaimed as German Emperor—one of the most dramatic events of the nineteenth century. Quoting from Treitschke, the leading German philosopher and historian of the reign of the first Emperor: "The Emperor, William I, said once to Bismarck, in a moment of irritation, 'Why talk of the Empire? The Empire is nothing but an expanded Prussia.' That was said with soldierly roughness, but it is true."

In the meantime, Napoleon III had abdicated; the French people were helpless against the Prussian armies; the new French government was compelled to provide for the payment to Prussia of an indemnity of five thousand million francs and to submit to the humiliation of ceding to the conqueror territory that had been possessed by France for centuries—substantially all of the Provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, 5,600

square miles, including 1,694 villages, towns and cities—among the oldest villages, towns and cities of all Europe—having only a little less than 1,600,000 inhabitants, who had been willing and true subjects of France for centuries, who loved her as we love our own country, and who hated the Prussians.

I have treated Alsace and Lorraine in 1914 as Prussian territory, for the reason that although nominally a possession of the newly created German Empire, it adjoins the territory of Prussia, and is ruled autocratically by the King of Prussia in his capacity as German Emperor. "The Empire is nothing but an expanded Prussia."

The pitiful story of the protests of the people of Alsace and Lorraine against being subjected to Prussian rule, a protest continued for many years, and the story of the futile efforts made by Prussia for 43 years to make the Alsatians and the Lorrainers willing subjects, are well told in a recent publication, "Alsace and Lorraine Under German Rule," by Professor Hazen of Columbia University (Henry Holt & Company, 1917).

But what did the Prussians gain beyond the 5,600 square miles of surface and more than a million and a half additional subjects? They secured a strategic frontier, with the fortresses of Metz and Strassburg. They secured fertile valleys. They secured a vast oil field in Lorraine. They secured enormous deposits of potash salts in Alsace, covering an area of seven square miles and ranging in thickness from 6 to 30 feet. The potash field in Alsace gave Germany before the war a world monopoly of that necessary product. That field has been estimated to contain 300,000,000 tons of pure potash, valued at more than three billion dollars. But vastly more important—"they secured the largest deposit of iron ore in Europe and the second largest in the world, surpassed in value and extent only by the Lake Superior deposit in Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota. The soil of the lost provinces has made Germany's fortunes. She has derived from it her metallurgical ascendancy, the motive power for her industries, her wealth, and as a consequence her naval, military and political power. * * * Without the production of the provinces she snatched from France forty-seven years ago, Germany would long since have exhausted her capacity for turning out the material of war. Liberate those provinces from her clutch, with their 21,000,000 tons of iron ore a year, their 10,000,000 tons of iron smeltings, their 19,000,000 tons of steel smeltings, and the useful coal fields of the Sarre valley—and a long step has been taken towards binding her down to peace." (Sidney Brooks in *North American Review* for November.)

Who says that short wars do not pay? Certainly, from the Prussian standpoint the war with France in 1870-71 paid—if the incurable antagonisms it caused are forgotten, and the "measureless cataclysm" of the present, of which the seizure of Alsace and Lorraine was a potent cause.

We have thus accounted for 33,355 square miles of territory of which Prussia's weaker neighbors were robbed in the course of seven years, within the lifetime of many of us, namely:

	Square Miles
Schleswig-Holstein	7,280
Hanover	14,840
Hesse-Cassel	3,699
Nassau	1,830
Hesse-Homburg	106
Alsace-Lorraine	5,600
	33,355

All this was in the reign of King William I, much beloved, much revered, as you may know, by the Prussian people.

As Bismarck reminded William I, when successfully developing in the King's mind, "a taste for conquest," every one of his predecessors had "won an increment for the state." (Bismarck's reminiscences.)

The acquisitions of his predecessors will be stated in fewer words.

Starting with the "Elector" Frederick William, who ruled from 1640 to 1688—for what we know as Prussia had not then attained to the rank of a kingdom, being then known as an electorate—and coming down to the reign of William I, with which we have dealt, the story of Prussian territorial growth is as follows:

Elector Frederick William. He made a record for his successors. In his reign, by the Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the "Thirty Years' War," Prussia acquired from Sweden a portion of Pomerania, about 8,000 square miles, the easterly portion of the present Prussian Province of Pomerania; also Minden, part of the present Province of Westphalia; also Magdeburg and Halberstadt, being parts of the present Province of Brandenburg.

Frederick I. This monarch ruled as Elector from 1688 to 1702 and from that year to 1713 as King—the difference being largely nominal. We find him adding to the Prussian domain by acquiring a portion of Saxony transferred to him by the then ruler of Saxony, who was hard up for money, and to whom Frederick I furnished 350,000 thalers. The territories so transferred are described as those of Nordhausen, Petersberg and Quedlinburg, located in what was then the north-western part of Saxony's dominions, and in the present Prussian Province of Saxony. The historians say that some feeling was shown by the people of the ceded districts against the transfer, but that they were held in check by troops. Thus Frederick I "won" his "increment," and without war and without robbery.

Frederick William I. (1713-1740.) In 1720, as a result of war with Sweden, this ruler forced from her another large portion of Pomerania, namely: that portion of the present

Prussian Province of Pomerania which lies west of the Oder river and south of the Peene river, including the islands of Usedom and Wollin and the city of Stettin, in which region is now located Prussia's great shipbuilding industries. The section then acquired covers approximately 2,000 square miles.

Frederick II. (1740-1786.) This monarch, known as Frederick the Great, made two big hauls. By war upon Austria, he seized and succeeded in holding Silesia, 15,560 square miles, now constituting the Province of Silesia of the Kingdom of Prussia. Its seizure was as unwarranted as any of the other Prussian seizures. It was of this robbery that Frederick the Great is quoted as saying: "I begin by taking; later I shall find pedants to show that I was quite within my rights." In his reign also occurred the first of the three infamous partitions of Poland, the last one causing an utter extinction of the ancient Kingdom of Poland. The first partition occurred in 1772, being condemned by nearly the whole civilized world as a monstrous crime, all historians, even Treitschke, agreeing that the idea was first suggested by Frederick II to his fellow robbers, Russia and Austria. By that first partition, Prussia obtained what was then known as West Prussia, comprehending at least 10,000 square miles, a larger area than that included within the present Province of West Prussia. This was taken by sheer brute force from a weak neighbor, without any compensation whatever; and, by Prussian methods, the weak neighbor was soon compelled to ratify the act.

Frederick William II. (1786-1797.) The second and third partitions of Poland occurred in 1793 and 1795 under this monarch. In 1793 Prussia acquired what is now known as the Prussian Province of Posen, containing 11,180 square miles, with millions of Polish inhabitants; and Prussia has been unsuccessfully endeavoring ever since that time to Prussianize them, as one may learn from German writers, chief among them Prince von Bulow. ("Imperial Germany" 1914.) In 1795 another large slice of Poland was taken, reaching as far east as the Niemen river, taking in Warsaw, the Polish capital, and containing many thousand square miles; but this last grab was taken from Prussia by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and handed over to Russia, perhaps the most powerful factor in the Congress.

Frederick William III. (1797-1840.) This monarch suffered great humiliation during the Napoleonic era; but through the Congress of Vienna, which, in 1815, dealt with peoples as if they were herds of cattle, he "won" handsome "increments" as compensation for his military assistance in accomplishing the downfall of Napoleon. The Congress confirmed his ownership of Posen, stolen by his predecessor from Poland, and gave him also the following:

	Square Miles
Part of Saxony.....	7,800
Swedish Pomerania	(about) 1,600
Rhenish Prussia	10,420
Westphalia	7,800

SAXONY. The King of Saxony had been too friendly with Napoleon; and at the Congress of Vienna Saxony's territory was treated as conquered country. Only Austria's vehement objection—and Austria, it will be remembered, was then the dominant unit among the German peoples—prevented complete annexation of all Saxony by Prussia. As it was, the Congress assigned to Prussia the northern portion of Saxony, consisting of 7,800 square miles—with nearly a million inhabitants—largely very fertile, and containing large deposits of coal, salt, copper, silver and plaster. The "increment" so "won" forms a large part of the present Province of Prussian Saxony, containing altogether 9,750 square miles, of which 7,800 square miles, as we have seen, were taken by Prussia from a weaker neighbor. (The Congress partially rehabilitated the King of Saxony, leaving to him the remaining 5,790 square miles of his territory, with something over a million inhabitants.)

SWEDISH POMERANIA. The portion of the present Prussian Province of Pomerania won by Prussia from the Congress of Vienna, is the extreme northwestern portion, north of the Peene River, including the island of Rügen. Its area is approximately 1,600 square miles. It had been a possession of Sweden for centuries. The Congress of Vienna took it from Sweden and gave it to Prussia, "compensating" Sweden by giving it Norway, taking the latter from Denmark. This was Prussia's third and final slice of old Pomerania, a Swedish possession. The others have been mentioned.

RHENISH PRUSSIA. The wonderfully fertile Province of Rhenish Prussia lies on both sides of the Rhine, immediately south of the Province of Westphalia. It contains 10,420 square miles, a large part of which was for the first time acquired by grace of the Congress of Vienna without the consent and against the wishes of the inhabitants, having before 1815 been a French possession for about twenty-five years and prior thereto under the rule of Archbishop Electors. We have the authority of Carl Schurz, in his very interesting *Reminiscences*, for saying that the universal hatred of Prussia by the people of the Rhenish province, including his own family, continued from 1815 to 1848 at least, such hatred being "in its fullest flower" in the latter year, when, because of participation in the revolutionary outbreak, and to escape execution, Schurz fled.

WESTPHALIA. This Prussian Province contains 7,800 square miles, only a small part of which had ever been possessed by Prussia until it was "won" from the Congress of Vienna. In the Napoleonic period the area above mentioned constituted part of the Kingdom of Westphalia formed by Napoleon, and for a very long time prior thereto it was broken up into several bishoprics and many small secular states, former units in the medieval empire that nominally ruled over a large part of central Europe. It has been a center of mineral industries for many years, being rich in coal, iron, copper, lead, zinc and other natural resources. In 1913 over 53 million

tons of coal and over 1,500,000 tons of iron ore were mined in this province.

Frederick William IV. (1840-1861.) This monarch kept up the unbroken record of his predecessors. He "won" his "increment," but without war. He had internal troubles on his hands and had no time for war with neighbors. The autocratic rulers of Austria, Prussia and the rulers of all the lesser German units, were standing together during the troublesome revolutionary days before mentioned. The addition made to Prussian territory was the district known as Hohenzollern and the Jahde district, the former being made an administrative division of Prussia in 1852. It is composed of a long narrow strip of land containing an area of 440 square miles, bounded on the north and east by Wurtemberg and on the west and south by Baden. It was inherited by the crown of Prussia in consequence of the revolutionary troubles of 1848 and the abdication of the Hohenzollern princes which resulted therefrom.

Of Prussia's 139,650 square miles (including Alsace-Lorraine) nearly 100,000 square miles were taken by conquest from weaker neighbors, namely:

	Square Miles
The robberies resulting from the wars of 1864	
1866 and 1871.....	33,355
Swedish Pomerania, Rhenish Prussia and a	
portion of Saxony, acquired in 1815, as the	
result of the Napoleonic wars.....	19,820
The partitions of helpless Poland in 1772 and	
1793	21,180
Silesia, by war with Austria, in 1742.....	15,560
Portion of Pomerania, by war, 1720... (about)	2,000
Portion of Pomerania, by war, 1648.. (about)	8,000
	99,915

Westphalia is excluded from the computation, though about 6,000 square miles of the territory acquired by Prussia in 1815 might with some reason be included. Minden, Magdeburg and Halberstadt are also excluded; also the part of Saxony transferred to Frederick I; also the Hohenzollern district.

The 99,915 square miles are over seventy per cent of all Prussia's territory in 1914.

Ann Arbor, Michigan, December, 1917.

APPENDIX.

Below is a copy of the telegram from Ems, received by Bismarck in Berlin at 6:09 P. M., on July 13, 1870:

"His Majesty writes to me: 'Count Benedetti spoke to me on the promenade, in order to demand from me, finally, in a very importunate manner, that I should authorize him to telegraph at once that I bound myself for all future time never again to give my consent if the Hohenzollerns should renew their candidature. I refused at last somewhat sternly, as it is neither right nor possible to undertake engagements of this kind *a tout jamais*. Naturally I told him that I had as yet received no news, and as he was earlier informed about Paris and Madrid than myself, he could clearly see that my government once more had no hand in the matter.' His Majesty has since received a letter from the Prince. His Majesty having told Count Benedetti that he was awaiting news from the Prince, has decided, with reference to the above demand, upon the representation of Count Eulenburg and myself, not to receive Count Benedetti again, but only to let him be informed through an aide-de-camp; that his Majesty had now received from the Prince confirmation of the news which Benedetti had already received from Paris, and had nothing further to say to the ambassador. His Majesty leaves it to your Excellency whether Benedetti's fresh demand and its rejection should not be at once communicated both to our ambassadors and to the press."

The telegram given out by Bismarck and published the following morning in all European capitals as his statement, is as follows:

"After the news of the renunciation of the hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern had been officially communicated to the imperial government of France by the royal government of Spain, the French ambassador at Ems further demanded of his Majesty the King that he would authorize him to telegraph to Paris that his Majesty the King bound himself for all future time never again to give his consent if the Hohenzollerns should renew their candidature. His Majesty the King thereupon decided not to receive the French ambassador again, and sent to tell him through the aide-de-camp on duty that his Majesty had nothing further to communicate to the ambassador."

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